INSIGHT INTO THAI POLITICS

A special report from one of Little Darwin's growing number of informed correspondents written before the ASEAN Summit.

THAI POLITICS have become more stable, less febrile and less fragile. Eton and Oxford educated Abhisit Vejjajiva, a real Bangkok anglophile, has done well as Prime Minister under close to impossible circumstances and will probably hold office longer than originally expected. His personal demeanour has been exemplary. He has, by example, set a new standard for the conduct of politics and political discourse. He has not allowed himself to be unnerved or distracted by the ephemeral, short term trivia which has become the opposition's stock in trade. Against the odds he has managed to maintain some discipline in his party and the coalition.

In the face of the global financial crisis he has wisely made economic policy the focus of his government's efforts. It is much too early to talk of success or failure but at least he has acted intelligently, calmly and usually credibly. The second focus has been the forthcoming ASEAN Summit. Against much advice and opposition he decided early that if he abandoned the summit it would seriously damage both Thailand's and his government's standing both internationally and domestically. His judgement has prevailed and any serious opposition to the summit will only damage his opponents. In relation to the divisive issue of how to deal with the unlawful actions of the PAD protesters who brought him to power he has refused to be pressured into inappropriate action, opting rather to let the law take its course - which it soon will. Very soon. Likewise he has firmly rejected proposals for a general amnesty for all disqualified politicians, there are many.

These proposals are put foward in the name of national reconciliation when in fact they are merely an attempt to rehabilitate Thaksin and the key members of his disbanded Thai Rak Thai party. The proponents of the amnesty genuinely do not seem to comprehend that the behavior of politicians should be subject to the regulation of the law. His greatest vulnerabilities lie in the political histories of some of his colleagues and in the incompetence, indiscretion and venality of some of his ministers. He has to work with some pretty poor material in his cabinet. (One scandalously incompetent minister runs her ministry from an office at home where her disqualified politician husband makes all the decisions and instructs senior civil servants.) The culture of parliamentary politics in Thailand remains very petty, self-seeking, short-term and grubby and this is the climate in which many of the politicians of the opposition Puer Thai and not a few of the governing coalition thrive.

Although the political temperature has been lowered parliamentary stability is not guaranteed. There are also structural problems. The current post-coup constitution is very rigid and, disregarding separation of powers, favours an exaggerated role for the courts in resolving issues which in other parliamentary systems would be the preserve of the parliament itself. This is leading to a highly vexatious approach to parliamentary practice and behaviour which could easily become destabilizing with otherwise well-performing and honourable ministers facing disqualification for very minor misdemeanours or even oversights. Many problems remain. The gulf between Yellow and Red remains. Both groups seem to be getting less public attention at the moment. However, the recent and inflammatory language of the PAD in proposing an "invasion of the North" and the brutish and intolerant behavior of the UDD in Chiang Mai (with the collusion of the local police) have discredited both groups.

Nevertheless the core supporters of both sides willl not be deterred. The underlying problems of social justice have still to be addressed. Despite some short-term relief in the face of the financial crisis and some well conceived initiatives targetting specific problems, the long-term and deep problems of structural disadvantage in rural communities, particularly in the North and the Northeast, still need to be dealt with - land reform, debt relief, price stability, equitable access to water, education. Then there are problems of a different order: the Military continue to lurk in the background at the same time underwriting the present government and by their very support undermining its very legitimacy; the more conservative elements of the Bangkok elite, the almost feudal (Fascist) conservatives are exercising highly undesirable influence in their traditional arena, cultural control - control of the media, control of the internet, obsession with national unity and the reputations of prominent persons and, most perniciously, with an almost unprecedented witchhunt for perpetrators of "lese majeste" - real or imagined; despite the good will of the present government the military are increasingly mired in a worsening situation in the South - their numbers are escalating, they are now speaking of the possibility of a thirty year intervention, they still appear to have little idea of what they are dealing with, there has been little redress of grievances, and the violence continues (death toll now 3,200 since January 4, 2004, mostly civilians and overwhelmingly Muslims); and finally there is the unspoken issue of succession to the throne.

Thaksin is not dead yet. He is certainly on the run and increasingly starved for oxygen in much of the Thai media except for his own "D (democracy) chanel" which is watched for 24 hours by the true believers. He is a driven man and literally a resourceful man. Many of his supporters do not seem to understand (they never have) the enormity of his abuse of the system - financial, legal, procedural and moral. However, he has lost face many times over and some of his supporters do seem to understand that. He has been convicted by the courts. He is a fugitive not prepared to face the legal consequences of his actions. Many of his assets have been frozen. He has divorced. He has been denied visas by significant foreign governments.

Both of his "nominee" governments have fallen. His Puea Thai party is seriously divided, greatly weakened by the defection of his allies in the Newin group, and effectively leaderless (apart from his numerous nepotistically appointed relatives). His loyal henchmen regularly belittle themselves by trotting off to Hong Kong to receive inspiration and instructions. He talks big on his phone-ins but delivers nothing. And greatest humiliation of all, he has been rejected as persona non grata by Manchester United.

Much of this will be treated by his core supporters as evidence of a monumental conspiracy against the man. But many others are probably beginning to have doubts. He is sidelined but it is still conceivable that he could make a come back - if the military concurs. Unlikely. However, there is one other scenario. Black Magic. Thaksin's illustrious cousin, General Chaisit Shinawatra has sponsored an elaborate ceremony in Chiang Mai. He hired nine monks to perform rites to extend the fugitive's life and to bring him back home. Then a medium was "possessed" by Thaksin from one of his previous lives who confessed to evil acts of removing a Buddha image and stealing when leading a military action in Burma two hundred years ago . This clearly was the source of his present bad kharma and the table was laid with two pigs heads, nine dead chickens, rice wine, sweets and fruits as offerings while cousin Chaisit secreted a sum of money behind a Buddha image to atone for the past wrongdoing and to purge his bad kharma. Then there were prayers to vanquish his four major enemies the current Prime minister and his deputy, Chairman of the King's Privy Council, General Prem, and one other privy councillor. Who needs rule of law, constitutional government or democracy!

This would be melodrama, a soap opera or a trivia show if it were not serious. It is not an isolated incident and many people take it seriously. It may have little to do with authentic Buddhism but it has a lot to do with Thai popular folk religion .